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Abstract  
The study analyzed Nigerian newspaper coverage of militancy in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. Content 
analysis was used to generate data for the study. Four purposively selected Nigerian national dailies: THISDAY, 
The Guardian, Vanguard, and The Sun published between January 1, 2006 and October 4, 2009 were content 
analyzed. The population was 5,532 issues from where a sample of 553 was systematically selected. The units of 
analysis for the study include straight news, feature article, editorial opinion, interview, and letter to the editor 
that made reference to militancy in the Niger Delta. Coding was by two independent coders based on frequency, 
prominence, portrayal of militancy, format of presentation, and language of reports. The results showed that 
Nigerian Newspapers covered militancy in the Niger Delta in a fair, balanced and responsible manner, even 
though there were a few instances when confrontational languages slipped into reports. It also found that the 
dailies accorded low prominence to reports on militancy in the Niger Delta and did not endorse militancy as the 
preferred option for resolving the conflict in the region. Rather, they advocated a peaceful resolution of the 
conflict as is evident in the high score (77.88%) of the use of conciliatory tone in their reports. On the downside, 
the preponderance of straight news indicated that not much of conflict analysis and interpretative reporting was 
done in the coverage to help readers grasp thoroughly the dominant issues involved in militancy. The conclusion 
is that by presenting a balanced coverage, the dailies have helped in setting the right agenda and mediating in the 
conflict. This may have contributed in some degree to the management of the problem of militancy in this 
region. Accordingly, it is recommended, among others, that reporters and editors should include more of feature 
articles, editorials, and interviews with conflict experts, victims, and local residents in their coverage. This will 
help create proper understanding of the issues at stake in order to facilitate early conflict resolution.  
 
1.0 Background to the study  
 The conflict in Nigeria’s Niger Delta was a burning issue between 2006 and 2009. Around the globe, it 
attracted serious attention from environmentalists, human rights activists, and fair trade advocates. The trial and 
hanging, in 1995, of environmentalist Ken Saro-Wiwa and his eight Ogoni kinsmen further drew tremendous 
global attention to it. The global outcry and condemnation that followed was unprecedented. The world, as it 
were, was roused into sudden realization of the seriousness of the silent but systemic environmental and 
economic war being waged by the Nigerian state and the oil transnational corporations (TNC’s) against the 
minorities of the Delta region. 
 At the heart of the conflict in the Niger Delta is the control of the vast crude oil deposits in the region. 
Legally, oil bearing communities have no control over the oil and gas reserves in their territory (The 1999 
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Clauses 44). The Petroleum Act of 1969, Clause 1 states 
explicitly: “the entire ownership and control of all petroleum in, under or upon any lands to which this section 
applies shall be vested in the state”. 
 What the Nigerian laws were silent on, however, was how to share the inevitable devastating 
consequences that accompany oil exploration. It is not surprising therefore that Niger Delta whose lands houses 
Nigeria’s vast oil and gas reserves are the direct victims of the serious environmental hazards associated with oil 
exploration. As the 2006 international study of the region confirms, “The damage from operation is chronic and 
cumulative, and has acted synergistically with other sources of environmental stress to result in a severe 
impaired coastal ecosystem and compromised the livelihoods and health of the region’s impoverished residents” 
(Niger Delta natural Resources Damage Assessment and Restoration Project Scoping Report, May 2006). Yet 
the report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment held in 1972 declares that “man’s 
environment, the natural and the man-made, are essential to his well-being and to the enjoyment of basic human 
rights even the right to life itself”. All these seem not to be part of the major concerns of the oil operators and the 
Nigerian Government who are satisfied so long as oil flows uninterrupted. 
 This neglect and insensitivity have made life a harrowing experience in the Niger Delta, even the 
Amnesty International, AI, (2009) study of the region had acknowledge this situation further giving credence to 
the high level of poverty and general neglect of the region. 
New Media and Mass Communication                                                                                                                                              www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-3267 (Paper) ISSN 2224-3275 (Online) 
Vol.44, 2015 
 
52 
 Contrasted with their striking poverty and the dehumanizing conditions of living is the enormous wealth 
generated by the oil in their land for the Nigerian state. it is estimated that Nigeria has earned $600 billion from 
oil since the 1960’s (Wurthmann, 2006). The report of the Niger Delta Technical Committee (November 2008, 
p.102) shows that “the oil and gas sector represents 97 percent of Nigeria’s foreign exchange revenues and 
contributes 79.5 percent of government revenue”. In return, the Delta region “has become one of the world’s 
starkest and most disturbing examples of the “resource curse” (AI, 2009, p.9). 
 All these natural blessings and man-made curses have angered the Niger Deltans. To register their 
displeasure, they organized non-violent protests after attempts to get justice from the law courts failed (Owugah, 
2009). Owugah blames the Nigerian government for the violent phase of the conflict. Many scholars have 
corroborated Owugah’s position. For example, Ibeanu and Luckham (2006, p.73) have argued that “the Federal 
Government itself has aggravated conflicts (in the Delta) through its needlessly violent responses” in a number 
of towns in the region, and one recent case is the May 2009 mass killing by the Joint Military Task Force (JTF) 
of hundreds of people in several communities of the Gbaramatu kingdom in Delta State in search of militants 
JTF said were behind the death of 11 soldiers. 
 Agitation for resource control snowballed into armed conflict manifested in killings, kidnapping, oil 
bunkering, bombing of oil installations, car bombs and general atmosphere of insecurity in the Niger Delta. A 
survey conducted in the region between September 2006 and April 2007 by the Geneva-based Small Arms 
Survey (SAS) found that, “militancy has grown in the Delta in response to the continued lack of attention (by the 
government) to the basic needs of the population” (p.16). Even with the Amnesty declared in 2009 for militants 
in Niger Delta by Nigeria’s late President Umaru Yar’Adua, the relative peace in the region is still fragile and 
kidnapping for ransom is far from over. A Nigerian daily reported that between 2006 and 2009 over 350 persons 
were kidnapped in Nigeria with over N6 billion paid as ransom to kidnappers (THISDAY, May 20, 2009, p.21). 
 Similarly, a Nigerian masgazine reported a loss of about N8.84 trillion oil revenue and over 1000 deaths 
to militancy between 2006 and 2008 (Newswatch, May 4, 2009, p.12-21). Yet, the Movement for the 
Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) declares that, “Niger Delta militants are not criminals, but freedom 
fighters who have over the years given their time, money, energy, liberty and lives towards ensuring that the 
Niger Delta people receive a fair treatment from oil companies and government for their God-given resources” 
(The Nation, March 18, 2010, p.15). 
 The group insists that it is fighting “a war of emancipation and not for self-aggrandisement …” (The 
Nation, October 21, 2007, p.8). But for Bolaji Akinyemi, Nigeria’s former Foreign Affairs Minister, the crisis in 
the Niger Delta, region “is more than an environmental issue; it is a combination of all these as it is now further 
compounded by becoming part of the struggle for a true federal and fiscal structure” (Newswatch, August 13, 
2007, p.15). 
 Given the role of the press as purveyors of information, reports of militancy in the Niger Delta were 
printed almost on daily basis in the Nigerian press within the study period (2006 – 2009). Through them, readers 
were kept abreast of the violent activities of Niger Delta militants (who some prefer to call revolutionary or 
freedom fighters) under the umbrella of MEND that arose in early 2006 and announced its arrival with the 
kidnapping of four expatriate oil-workers from a Shell flow station in Bayelsa, 11 January, 2006 (SAS, 2007). 
 It has, therefore, become pertinent to examine the quantity and quality of coverage accorded militancy 
in Nigerian newspapers within the period under investigation to establish wither newspaper coverage enabled 
readers to understand the dominant issues involved in militancy,  for as Gjelten (1998, p.15) remarks, “if 
conflicts are to be prevented or settled they must first be understood”. This entails adequate coverage in a context 
that gives meaning to issues using more of feature articles, editorials, and interviews with conflict experts, 
victims and local resident to help readers grasp thoroughly the issues at stake in order to facilitate early conflict 
resolution. In sum, the knot the study sought to untie is: What was the nature of Nigerian newspaper coverage of 
militancy in the Niger Delta? Do the newspapers act as agent of escalation or de-escalation of militancy through 
their coverage? This is the crux of the matter. 
2.0        Research Questions 
The following questions are raised in the study: 
1. What is the frequency of reports on militancy in Nigerian newspaper? 
2. How do the newspapers portray militancy in the Niger Delta? 
3. What is the prominence accorded reports on militancy in the newspapers studied? 
4. In what formats is militancy reported in Nigerian newspaper? 
5.  Did newspapers report on militancy in a language that was capable of escalating it? 
3.0 Conceptual Framework 
3.1 Manifestations of Militancy in the Niger Delta 
 Kidnapping 
Kidnapping has been described as a very cheap source of generating terror on the perceived opponent. It 
is a common law offence requiring “that one person takes and carries another person or a minor away by force or 
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fraud, without the consent of the person taken; and without lawful excuse” (cited in Newswatch, July, 26, 2010, 
p.18). 
Kidnapping is said to have begun in Nigeria in the 1990’s (Chatham House, 2006) but by February 
2007, it had become a “booming business” (BBC, 2007) in the Niger Delta earning for Nigeria in 2008 the sixth 
position among the 10 worst countries in the world where people could be easily kidnapped (Newswatch, July 
26, 2010, p. 17). In the Niger Delta, many believe that it is a tool in the hands of militants to attract global 
attention to the Niger Delta struggle for justice, resource control and self-determination as established by a 2007 
Small Arms Survey: “Groups in the Niger Delta have used the kidnapping of international oil workers to raise 
international attention regarding the plight of those living in the Delta, the environmental damage caused by oil 
spills and the oil industry and the demand for more local ownership of the extraction of natural resources” (p. 
69). 
Yet the Newswatch report cited above points out that kidnapping, “initially a tool of ideological struggle 
has since become a major business enterprise” because of the ransoms the kidnappers are reportedly paid to 
secure the release of victims. It has become so lucrative in Nigeria “that a number of criminal groups appear to 
have taken on the task in order simply to make money” (SAS, p. 69) thereby desecrating the Niger Delta 
struggle. Now, even minors are kidnapped for ransom. 
MEND’s spokesperson Gbomo Jomo is well aware that every genuine struggle must have its corrupt 
version as criminal minded people are likely to hide in the guise of the struggle to prosecute their selfish agenda: 
In any struggle, there are bound to be several versions as seen through the eyes of 
different participants. Some are fighting for a car, some for pride, some for job or 
even food to eat; the more ambitious with the hope that they may someday be 
governors or local government chairmen, legislators, etc in new states. This is 
normal (International Crisis Group (ICG), 2006, p.7). 
This was actaully the case in Aba (Abia State) where kidnappers and criminal gangs sacked the entire city 
forcing schools, banks, and other businesses to close shop in 2010. 
Even though accurate figures on the number of kidnap cases are not available, a Nigerian daily reported 
that between 2006 and 2009 over 350 people were kidnapped in Nigeria with over N6 billion paid as ransom to 
kidnappers (THISDAY, May 20, 2009, p. 21). Also, according to a 2010 Newswatch report, in 2006 alone, 72 
foreigners and 56 Nigerians were kidnapped. Fifty-seven foreigners and 10 Nigerians were held by kidnappers 
while at least 15 people were killed between January and March, 2007 (July 26, 2010, p.17). 
This compelled many Western countries to raise security alarm warning their nationals to leave the 
region or reduce their movement. Many foreign-owned oil and construction companies fled the region especially 
during the study period citing security concerns. Julius Berger, for instance, has pulled out of Rivers State 
thereby worsening the unemployment situation in the state as well as in Nigeria. 
Given the grave concerns for hostage’s safety, kidnappers have been able to draw global attention to 
themselves especially through media coverage because each case is “usually sensationalised in such a way that it 
would attract media worldwide, creating panic and fear in the families and home countries of the hostages.” As 
Ramachandran (2006) observes, “By reaching out to a global audience, militants have been able to amplify many 
times over the terror generated by a single incident of kidnapping…” (cited in Dode, 2007, p.166). And Niger 
Delta militants have exploited this technique to good advantage by posting brazen warnings as well as pictures of 
hostages in their custody on the Internet. In many cases, they have sent e-mail messages to journalists and media 
houses about their exploits and next line of action. 
MEND formed in early 2006 remains prominent among armed groups in the Niger Delta and has 
claimed responsibility for a number of hostage-takings, attacks on oil installations and deadly armed clashes with 
the Nigerian security forces. MEND’s early attacks included the kidnapping of four expatriate oil-workers from 
a Shell flow station in Bayelsa State, 11 January, 2006. Kidnapping for ransom has proved a veritable source of 
funding for militants fighting in the Delta region.  
And media reports have shown that state governments in the Niger Delta are often involved in 
negotiations with militants to secure the release of hostages, especially foreign nationals. Many have argued that 
state governments in the Niger Delta “have working relationships” (SAS, 2007, p. 71) with militants and this 
explains governments’ preference to negotiate the release of hostages with militants instead of applying force. 
The Small Arms Survey further indicated that although some hostages have been harmed, those who died or got 
injured “did so during rescue attempts by the Nigerian military or at the time of the kidnapping” and “not as a 
result of intentional shooting” (p. 69) by militants. 
 Vandalism of Oil Facilities/Oil bunkering  
Vandalism of oil facilities often precedes oil bunkering as the former paves way for militants to siphon 
off oil. Between 2006 and 2010, sabotage/vandalism, government sources claimed, caused 1,486 (45%) of the 
3,203 reported cases of oil spillage in Nigeria. Reports indicate that oil bunkering in Nigeria is an organised 
business involving the militants, NNPC officials, Nigerian security forces, top government officials and their 
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foreign collaborators. A 2002 report of the special security committee in oil-producing areas submitted to the 
Nigerian government (cited by the ICG, 2006, p. 8) uncovered “a cartel or mafia” who “run a network of agents 
to steal crude oil and finished products from pipelines in the Niger Delta region.” 
Udofia (2010) gave a graphic detail of how illegal bunkering is effected: 
Investigation has revealed that most of the people caught in the act of vandalism are 
errand boys to wealthy petroleum product marketers who survey grounds for the 
NNPC experts. They (the errand boys) help them to dig out the pipelines before the 
skilled engineers move in to open the pipes… welding machines are used to open 
the pipelines, the pumping machines and valves are for pumping of petrol from the 
pipelines into the tankers used for the operations... Once the valves are fixed and the 
engineers are notified, they would increase the pressure thereby increasing the 
volume of petrol pumped into tankers. Each operation fetches about one million 
Naira to the engineers at the pumping station (pp. 75-6). 
Militant leaders insist that oil bunkering would not have been possible without the involvement of the 
Nigerian law enforcement agents. They reveal that military personnel provide escorts to ships and tanker trucks 
transporting siphoned oil or allow them to pass established checkpoints (ICG, 2006; SAS, 2007). The siphoned 
oil is often escorted outside Nigeria’s borders from where it is moved to buyers in different countries. 
In 2004, industry experts, the ICG noted, had estimated that Nigeria lost anywhere from 70,000 to 
300,000 barrels per day (bpd) to oil bunkering, the equivalent output of a small oil producing country. In a 
December 2005 report, the Washington-based Council on Foreign Relations Independent Task Force calculated 
that a loss of just 70,000 barrels a day at a price of $60 a barrel “would generate over $1.5 billion per year – 
ample resources to fund arms trafficking, buy political influence, or both” (cited in ICG, 2006, p. 8).  
At the heat of the crisis, the Nigerian Government said it was losing 1 million bpd of crude oil to 
militancy in the Niger Delta. This translates to N8.7 billion daily going by $60 pb, while a daily loss of 200 
million scf of gas was being recorded, according to figures released by the Nigerian Gas Company in 2009 
(Daily Sun, May 25, 2009, p. 38). 
Illegal oil bunkering has been described as a lucrative enterprise, providing an estimated USD 1–4 
billion per year (Lubeck, Watts & Lipschutz, 2007). Both the International Crisis Group and the Geneva-based 
Small Arms Survey show that oil bunkering is a key source of funds for militants. It provides the needed funds to 
purchase more deadly weapons and in some cases oil is exchanged by militants directly for weapons (Davis, 
Von, Kemedi & Drennan, 2006; BBC, 2007). 
Oil bunkering has a relatively young history when compared with the age of Nigeria’s oil industry. 
Even though it has been on for years, the ICG disclosed that; “it was first recognised publicly as a major problem 
in the late 1990s” (p. 9). As ICG points out, it was Chris Finlayson, then managing director of Shell Petroleum 
Development Company (SPDC) that announced to journalists in 2003 that Shell had before now tolerated small-
scale theft of crude by impoverished locals but that the present large scale operation bore little resemblance to 
the activities of “disaffected youths”, suggesting that it has become an organised business. 
To siphon crude, pipelines are often vandalised. It is estimated that there are over 7,000 km of pipelines, 
600 oil fields and 5,000 oil wells in the Niger Delta (Lubeck, Watts & Lipschutz, 2007). May 8, 2007, MEND 
attacked and destroyed three major oil pipelines belonging to the Nigerian Agip Company in Bayelsa State. In an 
e-mail to newsmen in Yenagoa, the group said, “Today (May 8) at 0100 hours Nigerian time (0000GMT) 
fighters of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta attacked and destroyed three major pipelines 
in Bayelsa State of the Niger Delta” (THISDAY, May 9, 2007, p. 3). MEND threatened to blow up more 
pipelines between May 8 and May 29 when former President Obasanjo was due to hand over power. It was 
estimated that the nation incurred a loss of 170,000 bpd from that incident alone. 
Again, December 19, 2009, MEND claimed 35 of its fighters using five boats, assault rifles rocket 
launchers and heavy calibre machine guns unleashed a warning strike at 2 a.m. on major Shell/Chevron pipelines 
in Abonema, Rivers State (Weekly Star, 22 – 31 Dec., 2009, p. 5). The Rivers State Government and JTF denied 
the attacks.  
In the first half of 2006, Udofia (2010) put the figures of pipelines vandalised at 2,059 while in 2008 
product losses incurred through vandalism was 397,600 metric tons or N10.121 billion. A more reliable statistics 
is provided by the Ledum Mitee Technical Committee on the Niger Delta. According to their 2008 report, when 
gunmen believed to be militants attacked an oil facility belonging to SPDC, offshore EA field in Rivers State 
January 11, 2006 and kidnapped four expatriate oil workers, the country lost 120,000 bpd to the incident and 
another loss of 100,000 bpd the same day to a similar attack on a major crude oil pipeline in the Forcados, 
Nigeria. The report also indicates that January 16, 2007 militants attacked an oil vessel near the Bonny Island, 
Rivers State. Nigeria lost 187, 000 bpd.  The attack caused a major spill March 6, 2007 at a pipeline feeding the 
Bonny export terminal, which resulted in a loss of 150,000 bpd. 
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In the first nine months of 2008, the report further shows that Nigeria lost an estimated revenue of about 
N2.97 trillion or $20.7 billion to attacks on oil installations resulting in shutdowns and spillages. This figure is 
different from another estimated N430 billion or $3 billion lost to oil bunkering within the first seven months of 
2008. This puts the total losses within this period at N3.4 trillion or $23.7 billion (Newswatch, May 4, 2009, 
pp.12-21). 
The ICG earlier cited had accused Nigeria’s Federal Government of indirectly encouraging “violence in 
the Niger Delta by rewarding those who pose the greatest threats to oil facilities with juicy oil contracts and 
government positions” and ignoring those who abide by the rules (p. 1). However, oil bunkering has been at a 
price as many have lost their lives in the process following fire outbreaks from ruptured oil pipelines. Farmland 
have been destroyed and water polluted by oil spills from vandalised pipelines. 
In March 2007, the Federal Government responded with the establishment of a committee to assess the 
problem of oil pipelines vandalism and recommend measures to check the menace. The committee’s job 
included assessing the frequency and causes of sabotaged pipelines, identifying those areas most prone to 
sabotage and those involved in the damage, and recommending measures for reducing sabotage (Nigeria First, 
2007).  The committee’s report is yet to be made public and it is unclear whether it beat its one month deadline. 
 Killings, Hijackings, Car Bombs, and other Militant Acts 
Militancy in the Niger Delta has taken on various forms and violence underlines its varied 
manifestations in the region. Official statistics puts the number of deaths from militant-related activities at 1000 
in the period under study while car bombing appears to be the latest addition to the violence in the region. 
The JTF, the special security force set up in 2003 by the Obasanjo government to maintain peace in the 
region was drawn in a series of gun battles with militants during the study period, with varying casualty figures 
on both sides. While the study focuses on militants, JTF, the instrument of State aggression in the region (within 
the study period) has contributed to the killing of innocent civilians, and one prominent case is the May 2009 air, 
land and water raids on Gbaramatu Kingdom in Delta State that resulted in destruction of houses and property 
and deaths of hundreds of residents, according to the Amnesty International in a statement entitled “Nigeria: 
Unlawful killings/displacement/access to medical care” published in The Nation of Friday, May 22, 2009, pages 
2-3. 
In January 2006 when militants attacked Shell Benisede Pumping Station, 22 persons including 16 
soldiers were feared dead prompting SPDC to withdraw some 330 workers. The incident forced a 10% fall in 
Nigeria’s oil production. In a latter attack that same month, armed militants launched a bloody assault on the 
operational base of Agip in Port Harcourt, killed nine persons (eight police officers and a civilian) and carted 
away N5 million (The Beacon, Jan. 27 – Feb. 2, 2006, back page and page 3). 
May 4, 2007, a Saipem site in Rivers State was attacked, causing shut-in production. During the 
incident several oil workers were wounded and Nigeria lost 42, 000 bpd. The same month, on the 11th, 
protesters occupied the Bomu pipeline (Rivers State) forcing SPDC to shut-in production feeding the Bonny 
Light export terminals. 
Militants again blew off two Agip oil rigs in the Forcados, Delta State, April 8, 2008. Eleven soldiers 
were reportedly killed while 120,000 bpd was lost (Newswatch, May 4, 2009). The attacks on Agip did not abate 
as Agip vessels were bombed April 13 that year. Ten naval officers and some militants died in that incident. 
Again, over 100 deaths occurred when MEND struck SPDC’s Bonga facilities on deep offshore oil fields in 
Rivers June 19, 2008. 
Militants have also employed hijacking as a tactic. Wednesday, May 13, 2009, MV Spirit, a densate 
tanker chartered by the NNPC and a cargo vessel were hijacked by suspected militants believed to belong to the 
dreaded “Camp 5” in Delta State. In an e-mail to Reuters, MEND threatened that, “Effective 0000 hrs on 
Saturday, 6 May, 2009, the entire Niger Delta will be declared a no-fly zone to helicopters and float planes 
operating on behalf of oil companies” (THISDAY, May 15, 2009, p.7). This was perceived as a terror tactic 
because at the expiration of the deadline, helicopters and float planes owned by oil firms still flew across the 
region. 
Friday, June 12, 2009, MEND claimed it had used its Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG) to raze Otunana 
flow station belonging to Chevron Nigeria Tuesday, June 9. JTF dismissed the claim, rather describing the fire as 
an accident. MEND warned oil workers in the Niger Delta to evacuate the entire region, stating that, “Our 
mission is to destroy the facilities that are being used to generate funds to buy bombs to destroy our already 
traumatised communities and the killing of soldiers becomes necessary only in self-defense” (The Nation, June 
13, 2009, pp.1, 5). The paper reported on the same date that a shoot-out between militants and JTF in Bayelsa 
State resulted in the death of at least seven persons, including an Ijaw traditional chief.  
MEND launched two car bombings in April 2006. These bombings were believed to be the first in 
Nigeria: One killed many civilians outside a military barracks in Port Harcourt and the other exploded in a queue 
of petroleum tanker trucks outside a refinery in Warri (ICG, 2006). In March 2010, MEND planted car bombs 
near the venue of the Post Amnesty Summit organised by Vanguard Newspapers in collaboration with the Delta 
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State Government. Three persons were reportedly killed while many were injured (The Nation, March 18, 2010, 
p. 18). Relative peace has returned to the region following the amnesty declared for militants by former President 
Yar’Adua who died May, 2010.  
3.2 Interpretative Reporting in Conflict situations 
Gjelten (1998, p.15) makes the point that, “If conflicts are to be prevented or settled they must first be 
understood.” This informed position canvassed by Gjelten will be elusive without interpretative reporting, which 
has been variously described as taking “the reader behind the scenes of the day’s action,” relating “the news to 
the reader’s own framework and experience,” helping the reader “make sense out of the facts,” putting “meaning 
into the news” (cited in MacDougall, 1977, p.161). Ohaja (2005) summed up these various views on news 
interpretation as “adding illumination, depth and contextual analysis to salient issues … in the news” (p. 23). 
Given the complexities of conflict, there is a heightened need for interpretative reporting to help the 
reader make sense out of the series of interconnected issues involved, the claims and counter claims of the 
parties and the hidden agendas of the aggrieved parties, which are seldom covered in drab deadpan reporting. 
This demands contextual analysis, which Ohaja (2005) argues cogently would help “the reader to properly locate 
the event/issue in context or in the overall scheme of things as no event occurs in a vacuum” (p. 37). This is the 
task before the media in covering conflicts – it should recognise “the particular event as one of a series with both 
a cause and an effect” and the awareness (in conflict reportage) that “an item of news is not an isolated incident 
but one inevitably linked to a chain of other issues” (MacDougall, 1977, p.12). 
Echoing interpretative reporting, Pate (2002) provides the following guide for newspapers and 
magazines in their conflict reportage: 
 coherent presentation of facts of the basic elements and information required for knowing and understanding 
the subject being reported; 
 a context and background that provide connections to the past and concurrent issues at stake, personalities 
involved and events occurring; 
 more systematic information gathering, making the best use of many diverse sources of information and in 
enough depth to enhance understanding (pp. 138-9). 
In the Niger Delta, for instance, the conflict in the region has centred on the negative impacts of the oil 
industry on the environment and means of livelihood, mismanagement of oil revenue since independence, 
corruption, failure to redistribute oil wealth, the utter lack of development in the Delta, failure of oil wealth to be 
translated into better living conditions for Deltans, State aggression in the region and lately, resource control. 
These issues are intertwined and complex. Without in-depth reporting, the readers cannot understand the issues 
involved in the conflict. When this is the case, people are bound to misrepresent the conflict, finding a lasting 
solution can be elusive and the conflict will continue to take a toll on the nation. 
It is important as Eti (2009) advocates, “to frame the issues involved in conflict in such a way that they 
become more susceptible to management.” As the author notes: 
The way to achieve this is to undertake a wholistic (and in-depth, dispassionate) 
approach to conflict discourse and not just scanty reportage of conflict behaviours 
exhibited by the parties involved. A wholistic approach will include origin, 
dynamics, and options for resolution. Such an approach will be more beneficial to 
the course of resolving the conflict (p.102). 
Gjelten, a war correspondent, warns that “stories that pander to emotion and offer no insight or analysis 
titillate but do not explain and may even distort what has happened” (1998, p.16). Journalists must put more 
effort into explanation in conflict reporting and avoid oversimplification of issues and distortions. It must be 
acknowledged that it is difficult for journalists to obtain accurate information in times of violent conflict due to 
the dangers involved and because each side to the conflict wants to portray the enemy side as evil, journalists 
may find themselves at the mercy of rumour and propaganda; yet the position of the Delhi Union of Journalists 
(DUJ) is instructive when conflict breaks out: 
Accuracy in reporting facts is the first responsibility of the media. Where facts are 
disputed, the discrepancies should be pointed out and the sources questioned. 
Presenting several versions of incidents and using multiple sources of information is 
an inalienable part of credible reporting (cited in Thakurta, 2009, p. 95). 
In this way, journalists can keep their credibility intact, no matter the strain and pressure exerted on them in the 
discharge of their sacred duties. 
4.0 Theoretical Framework 
 Two theories are imperative in this study. They are: the Frustration – Aggression Theory and the Social 
Responsibility Theory. 
 The Frustration – Aggression Theory sterns from the pioneering work of John Dollard (a psychologist) 
and his associates in 1939 and was expanded by such scholars as Leonard Berkowitz (1963) and Aubrey Yates 
(1962). It focused on aggression resulting from inability to fulfill needs. The main thesis of this theory hinges on 
New Media and Mass Communication                                                                                                                                              www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-3267 (Paper) ISSN 2224-3275 (Online) 
Vol.44, 2015 
 
57 
the “want-get-ratio” (Feierabends, 1969, cited in Faleti, 2006, p.47) and the difference between “expected need 
satisfaction” and “actual need satisfaction” (Davies, 1962, p.6) i.e. the discrepancy between what people feel 
they want or deserve and what they actually get. 
 When what people get falls short of their expectations, frustration sets in. The tendency is for such 
frustrated folks to vent their anger on those they consider responsible for their deprivation. Gurr (1970) 
advocated this position this way: “the greater the discrepancy, however marginal between what is sought and 
what seems attainable, the greater will be the chances that anger and violence will result” (p.24). 
 Onyekosor (2014, p.51) in his contribution to media violence states, that “whether the person actually 
engages in aggressive actions will depend in part on his or her learning history, interpretations of the event and 
individual way of responding to frustration. He went further to add, “it also depends on the presence of 
aggression eliciting stimuli in the environment” (p.51). 
 As this theory demonstrates, aggression does not just erupt as a natural reason or instinct as realists and 
biological theorists assume, but it results from frustration and situations where the legitimate desires of an 
individual are denied either directly or by indirect consequences of the way society is organized, the feeling of 
disappointment may lead such a person to express his or her anger through violence. This violence is usually 
targeted at those such an individual deems responsible or people who are directly related to them. 
 This is the situation in Niger Delta today where aggrieved youths after many years of waiting in vain 
for a fair share of the oil wealth generated from their land have taken up arms against the state and those they 
consider as state collaborators. They vandalize oil pipelines, kidnap for ransom and for political bargaining as a 
way of giving expression to their anger and frustration towards those they hold responsible directly or indirectly 
for the suffering of the Niger Delta region. 
 The social responsibility theory on the other hand is a synthesis of the ideas espoused by the Hutchins 
commission on press freedom set up in the U.S. in 1942, following public disenchantment with the libertarian 
press theory, which turned out to serve the interests and tastes of the socially dominant class. A main feature of 
the theory is its emphasis that the media “be responsible for fostering productive and creative ‘Great 
Communities’.” To achieve this, the media are to give more attention to cultural pluralism, “by becoming the 
voice of all the people – not just elite groups (Baran & Davis, 2009, p.144). 
 The theory imposes a greater burden on the media to serve public interest. It thus provides some 
guidance on how this can be achieved as summarized in its basic tenets by McQuail (2005, p.172). 
 The media have obligations to society, and media ownership is a public trust. 
 New media should be truthful, accurate, fair, objective and balanced.  
 The media should be free, but self-regulated. 
 The media should follow agreed codes of ethics and professional conduct; and  
 Under some circumstance, government may need to intervene to safeguard the public interest. 
Guided by this theory, Nigeria newspapers should present truthful, accurate, fair and objective reports 
on militancy in the Niger Delta. As purveyors of information, Nigerian Newspapers should understand their 
position is one of public trust and should not betray public confidence by engaging in unethical reporting. 
Acting in a responsible manner, they should exercise due restraint and caution in their reportage bearing in 
mind that careless wording of reports can inflame passion and escalate conflict. Thus newspapers should 
become an impartial thirty party committed to restoring peace. Only an accurate account of each side’s claims 
and interests would be reported in a context that gives them meaning. 
5.0 Research Method    
5.1 Procedure  
 Content analysis research design was used in this study. Kelinger (2004) defines content analysis as “a 
method of studying and analysing communication in a systematic, objective, and quantitative manner for the 
purpose of measuring variables” (cited in Wimmer & Dominick 2006, p.150). Content analysis can be 
undertaken with any written material, from documents to interview transcriptions, from media products to 
personal interviews. Content analysis was used to assess the coverage of militancy in Nigerian newspapers. It 
ensured the study and analyses of newspaper coverage of militancy in a systematic, objective and quantitative 
manner.  
The population comprises all newspapers published in Nigeria. Four newspapers were purposively 
selected based on the following criteria: national spread; consistency of coverage of militancy in the Niger Delta; 
and consistency on the newsstand. The newspapers are – THISDAY, The Guardian, Vanguard and The Sun. The 
study covers a period of four years, spanning from January 1, 2006 to October 4, 2009, the day the period of 
grace provided by the Nigerian government for Niger Delta militants to embrace government’s offer of amnesty 
elapsed. Militancy peaked in the Niger Delta region within this period.  Within the study period, the total 
editions of the four dailies published and circulated total 5,532. The systematic sampling technique was used in 
selecting the editions of each newspaper to be studied. It is a sampling procedure in which every subject or unit 
is selected from the population. Ten percent of the population was studied and it amounted to 553 issues. 
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Approximately, each of the four newspapers yielded 138 issues of the sample. A skip interval of 10 was adopted, 
which was obtained by dividing the population (5,532) by the sample (553). Using the skip interval of 10, an 
issue was picked using the calendar for the years studied. To introduce randomness into the selection process, the 
starting point was often varied across the different months in each year.   
The units of analysis for the study are straight news, feature article, editorial, opinion, interview, 
advertorial, and letter to the editor that made reference to militancy in the Niger Delta. Coding was by two 
independent coders based on the parameters of frequency, prominence, portrayal of militancy, form of 
presentation, sources, balance, language/tone, and peace effort. 
6.0 Data Presentation and Analysis           
 The data collection instrument was the code sheet. The code sheet was used to code and analyse the 
coverage of militancy by four Nigerian national dailies: THISDAY, The Guardian, Vanguard, and The Sun.  
 
Table 1: Frequency of Reports on Militancy 
Newspapers Frequency Percentage (%) 
THISDAY 
The Guardian 
Vanguard 
The Sun 
159 
146 
171 
100 
27.60 
25.35 
29.69 
17.36 
Total 576 100 
    
 Table 1, shows that between January 1, 2006 and October the four dailies printed a total of 576 items on 
militancy in Niger Delta. The Vanguard gave the highest coverage to militancy, with 171 (29.69%) stories, 
followed by THISDAY that did 159 (27.60%) items. The Guardian and The Sun trailed behind with 146 
(25.35%) stories and 100 (17.36%) stories respectively. It is evident from Table 3 that the papers gave a 
reasonable attention to militancy in Niger Delta. Table 2 displays the portrayal of militancy.  
 
Table 2: Portrayal of Militancy in the Niger Delta  
 
Newspaper Portrayal variables Total 
Positive         N     
(%) 
Negative          N      
(%) 
Neutral          N    
(%) 
 
N     (%) 
THISDAY 12(23.53) 24(24.49) 123(28.81) 159(27.60) 
The Guardian  12(23.53) 19(19.39) 115(26.93) 146(25.35) 
Vanguard 13(25.49) 25(25.51) 133(31.15) 171(29.69) 
The Sun 14(27.45) 30(30.61) 56(13.11) 100(17.36) 
 51(8.85) 98(17.01) 427(74.13) 576(100) 
   
Portrayal was classified into three perspectives: Positive – editorial matters that gave subtle or explicit 
support for militancy in the Niger Delta; negative - editorial matters that condemned militancy; neutral – items 
that were equivocal or merely recounted a source’s opinion on militancy without expressing a definite stand on 
it.  
 In Table 2, of the 576 stories on militancy in the four dailies, 427 (74.13%) were neutral; 98 (17.01%) 
were negative. The four papers gave a positive portrayal of militancy in only 51 (8.85%) stories. At an individual 
level, it is evident from the Table that The Sun portrayed militancy most positively and negatively than the other 
three newspapers, while the Vanguard took the most detached position in its reportage. THISDAY and The 
Guardian trailed behind the Vanguard in negative portrayal of militancy as indicated in their 12 stories 
respectively as against the Vanguard’s 13. 
 In denouncing militancy, the Vanguard placed second behind The Sun. THISDAY and The Guardian 
followed closely in the third and fourth places respectively. In sum, the papers studied remained highly neutral 
by as much as 74.13% in their coverage of militancy, thus offering a balanced view of the issues involved.  
Again the papers gave more negative than positive portrayal of militancy in the margin of 17.10% to 
8.85%, an indication that they do not endorse militancy as the preferred option for resolving the conflict in the 
Niger Delta. Table 3 rates the prominence of militancy. 
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Table 3: Prominence of Reports on Militancy  
  
Newspaper Prominence Variables Total 
 
N     (%) High              N     (%) 
Medium             
N     (%) 
Low               N     
(%) 
THISDAY 
The Guardian 
Vanguard 
The Sun 
34(20.48) 
69(41.57) 
40(24.10) 
23(13.86) 
8(44.44) 
6(33.33) 
2(11.11) 
2(11.11) 
117(29.85) 
71(18.11) 
129(32.91) 
75(19.13) 
159(27.60) 
146925.35) 
171(29.69) 
100(17.36) 
 166(28.82)      18(3.13) 392(68.05) 576(100) 
 
 Table 3 rates the prominence the four newspapers accorded reports on militancy. The parameters used 
in gauging prominence were high, for editorial matters on militancy that appeared on the front, back and editorial 
pages. Medium, for those carried in supplements, special sections and pull outs; while low rated stories were 
tucked away in the inside pages. Given these criteria, therefore, more than two-third of the 576 stories carried by 
the four papers received low prominence, by as much as 68.05%. Stories that attracted high prominence stood at 
28.82%, while those with medium prominence accounted for 3.13% of all stories published. 
 Looking at the placement of stories in each of the four dailies, Table 5 indicates that The Guardian 
accorded the highest prominence to reports on militancy followed by THISDAY, the Vanguard, and The Sun in 
descending order. More than two-third of the Vanguard’s, THISDAY's and The Sun’s coverage of militancy 
appeared in the inside pages. Table 4 presents the format of newspaper reports on militancy. 
Table 4: Formats of reports on militancy 
Newspaper Format Variables Total 
 
 
N     (%) 
Straight  
news 
N     (%) 
Feature 
 
N     (%) 
Editorial 
 
N     (%) 
Opinion 
 
N     (%) 
Interview 
 
N     (%) 
Advertorial 
 
N     (%) 
Letter 
 
N     (%) 
THISDAY 119 
(28.81) 
14 (27.45) 3 (18.75) 7 (41.18) 6 (15.38) 3 (25.00) 7 (25.00) 159 
(27.60) 
The  
Guardian 
109 
(26.39) 16 (31.37) 3 (18.75) 2 (11.76) 10 (25.64) 3 (25.00) 3 (10.71) 
146 
(25.35) 
Vanguard  113 
(27.36) 
17 (33.33) 5 (31.25) 4 (23.53) 12 (30.77) 6 (50.00) 14 (50.00) 171 
(29.69) 
The Sun 72 (17.43) 4 (7.84) 5 (31.25) 4 (23.53) 11 (28.21) 0 (0.00) 4 (14.29) 100 
(17.36) 
 413 
(71.70) 
51 (8.85) 16 (2.78) 17 (2.95) 39 (6.77) 12 (2.08) 28 (4.86) 576 (100) 
 
Table 4 indicates that of a total of 576 articles carried by the four dailies, 413 (71.70%) were straight 
news reports; 51 (8.85%) stories appeared as feature articles, and interviews were done 39 (6.77%) times. The 
papers published opinions on militancy 17 (2.95%) times while editorials were done on 16 (2.78%) occasions. 
Readers’ letters were published 28 (4.86%) times while advertorials scored lowest as a format of presentation of 
issues on militancy. All the papers presented more than two-third of their reports on militancy in the straight 
news format. This result shows that much of the newspaper coverage of militancy was done by journalists, as it 
was presented in news stories and feature articles. The implication is that journalists were largely accountable for 
newspaper reports on militancy.   Table 5 displays language variables. 
Table 5:  Language of Reports on Militancy  
Newspaper Language Variables Total 
Confrontational N       
(%) 
Bias                
N     (%) 
Conciliatory              
N      (%) N     (%) 
THISDAY 
The Guardian 
Vanguard 
The Sun 
3(15.79) 
3(15.79) 
5(26.32) 
8(42.11) 
15(28.85) 
11(21.15) 
17(32.69) 
9(17.31) 
71(28.40) 
47(18.80) 
81(32.40) 
51(20.40) 
89(27.73) 
61(19.00) 
103(32.09) 
68(21.18) 
 19(5.92) 52(16.20) 250(77.88) 321(100) 
   
To determine the language of reports on militancy in the four newspapers three constructs were used: 
confrontational, biased and conciliatory. Confrontational articles took the stance that there was a “zero-sum” 
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conflict going on and used negative, emotionally charged words such as criminals, terrorists, separatists, rebels, 
etc, which tend to escalate rather than de-escalate the crisis to describe militants. 
 Therefore as shown in Table 5, the papers reported on militancy more in a manner that engenders peace 
as is evident in 77.88% score of the use of conciliatory language. Biased reports were circulated 52(16.20%) 
times, and confrontational languages slipped into the papers 19(5.92%) times within the period under 
investigation.   
 
 7.0 Discussion of Findings 
This section discusses the findings of the study in relation to the five research questions raised. 
7.1 Research Question One: What is the frequency of reports on militancy in Nigerian newspaper? 
The answer is found in Table 1 which presents the frequency of reports on militancy. The data 
contained in the Table clearly demonstrates the four dailies: THISDAY, The Guardian, Vanguard, and The Sun 
printed a total of 576 stories on militancy within the study period. 
This number is considered significant given that there were other issues in the polity at the time which 
also received press coverage. Thus, the newspapers registered militancy on public and policy agenda. This may 
have contributed to the search for a peaceful management of the conflict which resulted in the amnesty declared 
for Niger Delta militants in June 2009 by the Nigerian government, and other forms of assistance the Nigerian 
government received both locally and internationally to deal with the crisis.  
The frequency of reports on militancy helped draw global awareness to militancy and increased its 
salience among the public, thus confirming the media’s agenda setting function (Griffin, 2000; DeFleur, 2010). 
As McCombs and Shaw (1977) note, “The notion of the agenda-setting function of the mass media is a relational 
concept specifying a strong positive relationship between the emphases of mass communication and salience of 
these topics to the individuals in the audience” (p. 12). 
7.2 Research Question Two: How do the newspapers portray militancy in the Niger Delta? 
Table 2 supplies data which helps to answer this research question. Results show that 74.13% of stories 
were neutral. In other words, the stories were equivocal or merely recounted source’s opinion on militancy 
without expressing a definite stand on it. Stories which gave a negative portrayal to militancy (editorial matters 
that condemned militancy) accounted for 17.01% and only a paltry 8.85% depicted militancy as positive, that is, 
gave subtle or explicit support for militancy. 
The preponderance of neutral stories suggests that the newspapers offered a balanced view of the issues 
involved in the conflict. From the results, the prominence of negative portrayal over positive portrayal implies 
that the dailies do not endorse militancy as the preferred option for resolving the conflict in the Niger Delta. The 
dailies thus chose “to play the role of moderating third party in order to improve communication” among the 
stakeholders and “contribute to constructive conflict transformation” (Kempf, 2003, p. 83). 
However, while maintaining neutrality in reporting conflicts, it is equally important as Howard (2002) 
warns that journalists should not be mere disinterested professional observers/reporters. Part of their sacred duty 
to society is to exercise their professional judgment on what to report and how to report what in the interest of 
peace. 
7.3 Research Question Three: What is the prominence accorded reports on militancy in the 
newspapers studied? 
Results presented in Table 3 reveal that reports on militancy were accorded low prominence in the 
newspapers studied. A majority of the stories by as high as 68.05% were tucked away in the inside pages labeled 
Low prominence in the study. This figure represents over two-third of all editorial matters published on 
militancy. Stories that attracted high prominence, that is, those carried on the front, back and editorial pages 
accounted for 28.82%, while those carried in supplements, special sections, and pull outs described as medium in 
the study were insignificant 3.13%.   
The low prominence accorded reports on militancy as found from the present study contrasts sharply 
with what was found from Ikpe’s (2000) study which focused on the role of communication in the management 
of the 1993 conflict between the Academic Staff Union of Universities and the Federal Government of Nigeria. 
It was found from the study that Nigerian newspapers accorded a high prominence to reports on the conflict. The 
prominence of the conflict in the Daily Times (Nigeria) and The Guardian (Nigeria) was 85.5% and 63% 
respectively. 
The present result may be an indication that the dailies did not want to overheat the polity by according 
high visibility to militancy reports given the tensed atmosphere incessant cases of kidnapping had generated.  
Again, giving high prominence to reports on militancy could mean glamorising militants. Militants would be 
emboldened to escalate violence. Inadvertently, the dailies could be depicting the impotence of government and 
security forces to combat militancy. 
Thus the dailies acted in a responsible manner by helping to stifle Niger Delta militants of the “oxygen 
of publicity” on which terrorism thrives. In this way, they contributed to reducing the spread of fear and panic 
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often associated with acts of terror, thereby helping to stabilise society and to save lives. By refusing to accord a 
high prominence to acts of militancy, the Nigerian press has acted in line with the social responsibility theory, 
which requires that it serve public interest. 
7.4 Research Question Four: In what formats is militancy reported in Nigerian newspaper? 
Formats represent the journalistic genre in which editorial matters on militancy were presented in the 
dailies. In the study, seven categories were identified and coded as can be seen in Table 4 which provides the 
answer for our research question. From the Table, 71.70% of the reports on militancy occurred as straight news. 
Feature articles took 8.85% while interviews represent 6.77% of the formats used. Editorials, Opinions, 
Advertorials and Letters-to-the editor appeared once in a long while such that they made up only 12.67%. 
The result brings to the fore once more that newspaper is by tradition a carrier of straight news. Yet this 
has serious implications for equipping readers in identifying the predominant issues involved in militancy. 
Straight news does not answer the questions of “how” and “why” – what interpretative and investigative 
journalism does – and may therefore fail to present issues in sufficient depth to illuminate meaning. 
Besides, the present results establish that the press did not do much of conflict analysis, which would 
have aided the public more to understand the roots of militancy in the Niger Delta. As many people agree, 
without a proper understanding of conflict it will be difficult to proffer the right solution (Gjelten, 1998; Best, 
2007). If the press had done much in terms of conflict analysis, there would have been more of feature articles, 
editorials, and interviews. 
An earlier study by Goretti (2007) of two Uganda newspaper coverage of the conflict in Northern 
Uganda also showed that the predominant format of presentation of reports was in news format. News stories 
constituted 77%; feature took 13%, while opinion pieces, editorials, commentaries, and letters made up 9%. The 
result is further corroborated by the findings of a 2009 IMS-led study on media coverage of the Darfur conflict in 
Sudanese and non-Sudanese media in which news reports formed 59.3% of the mode of coverage in the print 
media. 
7.5 Research Question Five: Did newspapers report on militancy in a language     that was capable of 
escalating it? 
Language used in the coverage was analysed and grouped into three categories: confrontational, biased 
and conciliatory. The use of confrontational and biased tone was considered negative and as such capable of 
escalating militancy in the Niger Delta region, while conciliatory wording of reports was deemed positive and 
capable of dousing hostilities in the region, for as the Holy Bible notes, “A soft answer turns away wrath, but 
harsh words cause quarrels” (The Living Bible, Prov. 15:1). This alludes to the strong effect word choice can 
have on any situation. 
Based on Table 5, the use of conciliatory language scored 77.88% while confrontational and bias 
language scored 22.12% in the coverage of militancy. From the result, it is evident that the Nigerian press 
covered militancy in the Niger Delta more in a manner that engenders peace. Yet there is evidence to suggest 
that some reports were couched in a language that was capable of escalating militancy. Words are powerful; they 
can prevent or douse hostilities and even exacerbate it. Even though the dailies scored high in their attempt to 
contribute positively towards the restoration of peace in the Niger Delta by couching most of their reports in a 
conciliatory tone, the few instances confrontational and biased language slipped into reports were capable of 
escalating militancy in the Niger Delta. This calls for increased constructive vigilance on the part of reporters 
and editors, two main media gatekeepers. The results notwithstanding, the Nigerian press performed better than 
the outcome of Goretti (2007) study in which the use of confrontational language was 41% and 22% in two 
Ugandan newspaper coverage of the conflict in Northern Uganda. 
8 Conclusions 
Based on the above findings, the following conclusions are reached. 
1. By presenting a balanced coverage, the newspapers have helped in setting the right agenda and mediating in 
the conflict. This may have contributed in some degree to the management of the problem of militancy. 
2. Given the adequate coverage of militancy, the press helped to raise global awareness of militancy in the 
Niger Delta. 
3. By according low prominence to reports on militancy, the press contributed to reducing the spread of fear 
and panic often associated with acts of terror, thereby helping to stabilise society and to save lives. 
4. Professionally speaking, the preponderance of the straight news format in presentation of reports on 
militancy means that it will be difficult for newspapers to get to the roots of the violence in the Niger Delta. 
Reports may not sufficiently equip readers to identify the dominant issues involved in militancy. 
5. Journalists are largely responsible for what readers get to learn about militancy in the Niger Delta. 
Depending on the way they portray militancy, readers’ perception will be shaped accordingly. 
 
9 Recommendations 
Given the findings and conclusions reached, three key recommendations are put forward. 
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1. To get to the roots of the causes of militancy, reporters and editors should include more of feature articles, 
editorials and interviews with conflict experts, victims, and local residents in their coverage. This will help 
create proper understanding of the issues at stake in order to facilitate early resolution of the conflict. 
2. The use of confrontational language to describe any of the parties in a skirmish should be dropped. Such 
words tend to escalate rather than douse hostilities. 
3. Conflict sensitive journalism should be developed and taught in journalism schools, mass communication 
departments and journalism-related fields in Nigerian tertiary institutions. This will enhance a better 
understanding of the dynamics of conflict by journalists and engender a more responsible reporting of 
conflict situations in the news media. 
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